Abstract:
Introduction
In recent years, immigration issues have dominated political debates and media reports in all European Union member states. Both in countries with significant shares of immigrants in their population and a relatively long and extensive history of migration policy and in countries with negligible numbers of immigrants and a poorly developed migration even intentions ascribed to them, they obviously influence political strategies adopted in the area of migration policy.
Another useful approach to the analysis below, starting from the theoretical assumptions of critical security studies (Bilgin 2012) , developed within the constructivist approach to security (Buzan Waever and Wilde 1998; Williams 2003) , widely used in the area of international relations and political science, is that security and related issues also become social constructs, "a determined way of presenting reality" (Waever 1996:106) . This fundamental assumption of securitization theory means that it is impossible to ever fully assess whether security and security threats are 'real' or not. In its broadest sense, "the concepts of securitization implies that threats are not out there but constructed by social actors" (van Munster 2009:5) . According to Ole Waever and his colleagues from the so-called 'Copenhagen School', a security issue arises as a result of the discursive process that makes it very important and requiring immediate response. The creators of the securitization theory pointed out: "'Security' is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue -not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998:24) . Therefore, the securitization of the issue by a securitizing actor within a 'speech act' defines the issue -as part of the discourse -as an existential threat to the survival of a 'referent object' (such as a nation, a society, a state) and needs the acceptance as such by the 'audience' of the speech act (e.g. public opinion). In this approach, the EU policy towards immigration is not only an attempted reply to real and objective problems related to the growth of international crime, especially terrorism or the growing unwillingness of European societies to accept immigrants (which is difficult to deny), but also as a result of effective rhetorical "education" in which particular issues are interpreted as threats and risks to security.
What is also important it is that the securitized issue requires "emergency measures and actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure" (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998:25) . As Ole Waever noticed, the securitizing actor "moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it" (1995:55).
The original version of the securitization theory was further developed and redefined.
Some scholars have retained the emphasis on the role of speech acts in the securitization processes and apply securitization as an approach to the study of public discourses (e.g. analysing political speeches). Others, led by Didier Bigo, have left the study of securitization through speech acts and shifted to the study of securitization through practice. Bigo assumed that some issues can be securitized "without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse " (2000:194) . Highlighting the role of practice, Bigo referred securitization processes mostly to practices of bureaucratic experts, acting in the frame of structures and networks linked to security practice and using specific technologies.
Advocates of this approach, like Sarah Leonard, add that "it is also more adequate to focus on practice, rather than discourses, when analyzing securitization processes (regarding not only migration and asylum, but also other issues) in the EU… The EU is evidently not the state; it has no government or president to make the kind of dramatic securitizing speech acts that can be identified in national contexts " (2011:236) . On the other hand, the EU is not solely a bureaucratic body; it is at least equally a political community, plunging into emotions and tensions between member states (or between member states and European institutions).
As Rens van Munster rightly notes, "the political and bureaucratic levels of the EU are mutually constitutive (..), and although the main security dynamics are located at the bureaucratic level (…), the political level often plays an important role in either authorizing, legitimizing, justifying, thwarting, dislocating or upsetting the enunciations of security professionals" (2009:6).
The EU migration policy in the frame of security
The main thesis of this paper is the acknowledgement that the EU immigration policy is shaped within the discourse on European security, which provides political narrations on migration with main explanation and interpretation schemes. The debate over the refugee humanitarian crisis or, more broadly, the migration crisis and the EU activities from 2015-2017 that followed it, not only emphasized these issues, but also gave the security dimension absolute priority in the EU agenda on migration.
The above can somehow be attributed to the fact that from its very origins, the development of the EU immigration policy was a consequence of freedom to cross borders within the Schengen zone. This policy was initiated as one of a whole range of compensation means, i.e. solutions aimed at improving security due to its potential weakening stemming from eliminating controls on borders between member states. This led to focusing the EU activities in the area of immigration on solutions concerning rules for foreigners' entry and stay in the Schengen area, which created various constraints and barriers from the very beginning.
Since 1999, when the Schengen area became part of the EU due to the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, one of the key objectives of the Union has been to provide its citizens with an area for freedom, security and justice (European Union 2012: article 3). The process of accomplishing these goals has become a dynamic and important sphere of EU activities and, simultaneously, a daunting task, since it is related to strongly "nationalized" issues, such as security, citizenship or political identity. The treaty provisions offer a specific understanding of what this space of freedom, security and justice is. It has been assumed that it means that within it there are no internal borders and there is "the free movement of persons … in conjunction with directly related flanking measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and immigration, and preventing and combating of crime" (European Union 2012: article 61 point a). In other words, in order to ensure that EU citizens enjoy freedom understood as freedom of movement, some activities are undertaken, aimed at ensuring security and related to: controls of external borders, asylum, immigration, preventing and combating crime. Therefore, the issues concerning rules of crossing borders, asylum and immigration are, first of all, institutionalized in the same area as the issues of international crime (for example trans-border crime or terrorism), and secondly, they are placed in the space of potential threats to the internal security of the EU (Bigo 2002).
Moreover, in the Vienna Action Plan (the programme for the implementation of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty referring to the AFSJ), "the freedom to live in a lawabiding environment is in turn operationalized as the freedom from those who are identified as abusers of that freedom" (van Munster 2009: 74) . Analysing the process of institutionalization and operationalization in the area of freedom, security and justice within the EU, as well as the disputes led in the European Council and during the intergovernmental reintroduced border control on its land borders after the terrorist attack in 2015 in Paris. All these countries prolonged their border control a few times for the following months. Thus, these 'temporary' measures of reintroducing controls on internal borders have been used for more than two years. Thus, the European Commission proposed a new amendment to the Schengen Border Code, allowing countries to reintroduce border controls even up to 3 or 4 years.
To summarize, in reaction to the migration crisis, whose significant dimension was the refugee crisis, both at the EU and at the national level, the postulate of 'secure borders' was used. Border security generally boiled down to the care for the security of the receiving societies, practically omitting the issues of the persons who were crossing these borders.
Secure borders were understood as tight borders, even impenetrable ones, those which prevent or at least limit significantly the inflow of threats and risks to European societies, as such threats and risks were perceived in unwanted immigrants. Tightening the borders thus gained two key interpretations. Firstly, it was implemented by means of intensifying controls on external borders by developing institutions, funds and specific instruments (including military ones) used for limiting the inflow of immigrants into the EU, or even through symbolically 'closing' the borders by erecting physical border defences, such as walls or barbed wire fencings. Secondly, tightening the borders also meant a 'restoration of borders', referring to the temporary reintroduction of personal controls on selected internal borders and establishing additional limits concerning, for example, the right to submit applications for international protection (like in Austria and Germany in 2015).
In all indicated actions, borders have become important elements protecting against mass and undocumented immigration, regardless of the fact that this group also included people seeking asylum. The functions of borders were narrowed down to creating a tight barrier protecting a particular society, community or political organism against the external forces that threaten its existence, survival, stable existence etc., and irregular immigration to the EU was considered to be such a major force.
Conclusions
The aim of the article was to present the nature of the European Union's immigration policy emerging from the actions taken by the EU as a response to the migration crisis connected with the unprecedented inflow of great numbers of economic immigrants and people seeking asylum in the member states in recent years. The article shows that security has become the factor regulating the EU immigration policy, determining how it is conducted (and developed), whereas the notion of security itself and the meaning ascribed to it have fundamentally affected the shape and nature of the adopted solutions within this policy. In the crisis connected with the inflow of a large number of migrants into the EU, including potential refugees, the exemplification of adopting the paradigm of security in the EU immigration policy has been the implementation of the postulate of 'secure borders', understood as achieving the highest possible degree of their tightness and impenetrability.
As a result, the EU's reaction to the immigration crisis has proved to be a fragmentary, reductionist and, in the long run, insufficient approach to migration issues. First of all, this means that the top priority in EU activities towards immigration are the issues connected with rules and regulations governing immigrants' entry and stay in the EU. This issue is already reduced and concerns mostly actions aimed at limiting the inflow of unregulated immigration into the EU, through developing legal, institutional and financial instruments within the integrated management of the EU external borders and the policy of returns, deportations and readmissions. It should be noted that the very definition of what is and what is not unregulated immigration has not only been rendered relative, but also political. As a result, the issues concerning legal migrations, including potential challenges revealed in this area for many years, have been pushed out of the European focus.
Secondly, this brings about some consequences -marginalizing the issues from other areas of immigration policy, especially issues concerning the immigrants' integration policy.
These issues, though mostly vital for internal security and public order in member states (for example, due to processes of radicalization of attitudes and growing terrorist threats), have not become the subject of EU debates or the area for which effective strategies and instruments are created at community level.
Thirdly, subordinating the EU immigration policy to the security paradigm results in the securitization of asylum policy and, so to speak, the 'suspension' of the humanitarian dimension of this policy. Bearing in mind the fact that border control and asylum policies are in fact inseparable, focusing EU actions on implementing the restrictive admission policy leads to deficits in the EU's legal, international and moral commitments concerning its policy towards refugees. These processes were also associated with -well visible in many EU and domestic debates -blurring distinctions between people seeking asylum and irregular economic immigrants, which in practice translated into political postulates to deny these people entry into EU territory. In public rhetoric, the category of 'refugee', just like an economic immigrant before, was gradually subjected to processes of securitization and the refugee, from a person seeking shelter and international protection, escaping war and anarchy that threaten their life, has become a person who carries this threat with them and who threatens public security and order in the EU member states.
And fourthly, reducing the EU actions concerning immigration to the fight against irregular immigration by means of strengthening border controls or establishing additional barriers to migration means, in fact, the implementation of a highly ineffective policy. This is mainly because it is based on vain expectations that borders will become effective barriers to population flow. The approach consisting of identifying secure borders with their tightness denies the facts and regularities described by scientists for many years. There is no easy way of blocking the migrants' routes, but they can be better organized † † † † † . What is more, it will be difficult to stop desperate people who, regardless of whether they are welcome in the EU or not, will come here since -to put it short -they are subjected to very strong pushing factors. Finally, this approach denies the fact that porosity is an inherent feature of borders (Brunet-Jailly 2007:2) . This feature makes the provision of 'secure borders' a special challenge to security policies. It is necessary in this respect to recognize that "security is not equal to freedom and cannot be treated as a goal itself" (Jeandesboz 2016:17) . Security is a measure adopted to provide greater freedom and protection of fundamental rights. † † † † † The activities limiting the inflow of immigrants in one migration route lead to the growing inflow via other routes, which can be seen in the period of 2014-2016 in the changing routes that refugees from Syria took when fleeing to Europe: first, in 2014, Syrians escaped through Jordan to Egypt and mostly to Libya, where they embarked on boats sailing to Europe along the so-called mid-Mediterranean route. In 2015, the situation changed, as the war broke out in Libya and Egypt -pressed by the EU -introduced stricter visa requirements. The Syrians started to flee to Turkey and then, through the Aegean Sea to Greece and then along the Balkan route to Central Europe. This East-European route was blocked by the agreement between the EU and Turkey, concluded on 16 th March 2016. Refugees obviously did not disappear -merely one month later, the rates of Syrians trying to enter the EU via the Central European route increased significantly.
